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Does Latino Population Induce White Flight?   










Whether local minority population induces white flight to suburbs or private schools is a 
question of interest to many researchers.  However, empirically identifying the causality is 
difficult due to residential sorting.    Relying on a residential sorting model, I assume that people 
live in the same neighborhood are homogenous.    I identify the effect of local Latino population 
on white flight by using the cohort-to-cohort change in the ethnic composition within each 
neighborhood, which is a credibly idiosyncratic variation.  Using Los Angeles Family and 
Neighborhood Survey, I find that for every 10 percentage points increase in the share of Latinos 
in a white child’s cohort and neighborhood, she is more likely to attend private school by 3 
percentage points, or her household is more likely to move to a less Latino neighborhood in the 
next two years by 6-8 percentage points.    Estimates imply that 88% of decrease in public school 
enrollment rate in California during 1990-2000 can be explained by white flight from Latinos. 
                                                        
* I thank Vernon Henderson, Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Anna Aizer and Naci Mocan for all their insightful 
suggestions. I thank the participants of the presentation at Tulane University and PAA 2010.    All errors are mine.   2
1. Introduction 
 
Latino population in the U.S. has been rapidly increasing in the past 30 years.  Latinos 
accounted for 6.4% of U.S. population in 1980, but 15% in 2008.  Latinos not only increase 
numerically but also spread geographically.  Beside the several traditional Latino-concentrated 
states (e.g. CA, TX, FL), there has been an increasing movement of Latinos, since 1990, to 
“nontraditional” states such as NC, GA and IW.    As millions of Latinos flow into communities 
all over this country, one may wonder whether non-Hispanic white households would try to avoid 
contact with Latinos by sending children to private schools or moving to less Hispanic 
neighborhoods.  Appendix  Table  1  presents  some  evidence in California state, the state that has 
largest Latino population in the U.S..    Between 1990 and 2000, as Hispanic population increased 
by 3.41 million, non-Hispanic white population reduced by 1.32 million.    Moreover, the public 
school enrollment rate of white children decreased by 2.4 percent, while the rate for Hispanic 
children increases by 1.3 percent.  Considering that the Latino population in the U.S. is still 
growing and dispersing, investigating white flight induced by Latinos can help to predict further 
segregation by ethnicity and to understand one of the obstacles to assimilation for Latino 
immigrants. 
While many studies find evidence that white flight from public schools is related to the share 
of local population that is black, e.g. Colon and Kimenyi (1991) Lakeford, Lee and Wyckoff 
(1995), and Fairlie and Resch (2001), white flight from Latinos does not receive as much 
attention from scholars.  Two papers, which study the impact of immigrant population on 
neighborhood and school choice dynamics, are related to this study, since Latino is the largest 
ethnicity in US foreign-born population.    Betts and Fairlie (2001) find that the more immigrants 
a metropolitan area received from 1980 to 1990, the greater the increase in private school 
enrollment of that metropolitan area.    However, one criticism to their study is that some metro 
areas could be experiencing an economic boom and consequently the residents in those metro 
areas could have more income and become more able to afford private schools.    In addition, the 
authors themselves state that future research using more narrowly defined geographic areas is 
urgent, because whites can also flee to other neighborhoods within the same metro area.  Saiz 
(2006) finds that within metropolitan areas, inflow of immigrants to some census tracts causes   3
housing prices in those census tracts to grow slower than in other neighborhoods, which provides 
evidence of native flight.  Saiz attributes the reason for such native flight to immigrants’ race 
and relatively low education.   
This paper emphasizes that one of the reasons why non-Hispanic white households flee from 
Latinos could be that white parents fear a potential negative peer effect from Latino children on 
their children’s schooling outcome.    My empirical strategy is as follows.    Based on residential 
sorting theory, I assume that households live in the same neighborhood (defined as a census tract 
in this paper) have very similar observed and unobserved characteristics.    However, within one 
census tract, the share of Latino population could vary by cohorts, which is a plausible 
idiosyncratic variation.
1  Then my strategy is to use a census tract fixed effect model to test 
whether parents of a child in a more Latino cohort in a certain census tract are more likely to send 
their child to private school or to plan to move away than parents who live in the same census 
tract with smaller share Latinos in their child’s cohort.  This census tract fixed effect model 
comparing different cohorts within one neighborhood is free of the bias that can be caused by 
residential sorting or school supply side.    To further eliminate time trend in the share of Latino 
population, in children’s private school attendance and in their intention to move, I also put in 
children’s age dummies as control variables.
2   
My empirical analysis using the data of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey 
derives the following results: for every 10 percentage points increase in the share of Latinos in a 
white child’s cohort and neighborhood, she is more likely to attend private school by 3 
percentage points, or her household is more likely to move in the next two years by 8 percentage 
points.  The result of my falsification test is interesting.  A white parent’s school choice and 
intention to move does not respond to the share of Latinos in a cohort that is older or younger 
than her own child’s cohort.  This falsification test provides strong evidence that white 
households’ aversion to Latinos arises from white parents’ eagerness to ensure that their 
                                                        
1  Hoxby (2000) uses the cohort variation in gender and race composition within a school to identify peer effect on 
students’ test scores.  Similar identification strategy can also be seen in Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008), in which 
the authors examine the impact of neighbors in the same census block on an individual’s labor market outcome 
after controlling for the individual’s presence in a broader neighborhood (i.e. census tract). 
2 One has to be aware here that the cohort in a census tract may not be a good proxy of the same grade peers at 
school, since a school attendance area boundary does not necessarily correspond to a census tract boundary.  To 
obtain a more precise measure of ethnic composition of a child’s peers at school, one needs data at school 
attendance area level.   4
children’s education is not affected by disadvantaged minority peers.  However, this study 
cannot distinguish whether white households’ flight from children’s Latino peers is based on real 
experience of negative peer effects from Latino children, or simply due to racial prejudice or 
cultural differences.  For example, a white child could be upset that he wants to play baseball 
with peers but his many Latino classmates are only interested in playing soccer.   
I want to be clear about what peer effects include.  The negative impact can take place 
through the following channels: (1) Latinos account for the largest proportion of Limited English 
Proficient (LEP) students (Chapa 1990).  A teacher of a class with some Latino LEP students 
may have to slow her lecture to make sure everyone keeps pace.  Hence, non-Hispanic white 
children’s potential may not be met.  (2) Racial tension in the classroom may interfere with 
learning (Hoxby 2000).  (3) About 14% (1.8 million) of Latino children are unauthorized 
immigrants themselves (Passel 2006).  These children can’t go to U.S. public colleges with 
in-state tuitions.
3  This situation may discourage them from working hard to achieve good 
school performance.    Poor attitude toward study can be contagious to other students.    The peer 
effect in this paper refers to the total effect arising through multiple channels. 
The other findings of this paper include the followings.  First, for a multi-child white 
household, its intention of moving responds to the Latino share in the eldest child’s cohort and 
also responds to the maximum Latino share among all children.  Other children are less 
influential.  Second, white parents with different education backgrounds have different 
responses to excessive Latino shares in their child’s cohort.    Parents with no more than 12 years 
of schooling do not respond by sending their children to private schools.  They would rather 
consider a moving.    Parents with more than 12 years of schooling react by sending their children 
to private schools.  While they also consider moving, their moving tendency is not as large as 
their less educated counterparts.    Note that parents’ intention to move reflects their regret about 
their previous location choice.  When parents choose where to live, they only have an overall 
impression about how each neighborhood is ethnically mixed.    But they are lack of information 
about the ethnic composition of each cohort within a neighborhood. 
The remainder of this paper is composed of five sections: Section 2 provides a spatial model 
                                                        
3  Starting from 2001, Texas, California and several other states enacted the law allowing undocumented 
immigrant students to attend state university with in-state tuition.   5
to explain the causal links between the influx of Latino population and the dynamics of white 
families’ school and neighborhood choices.  Section 3 introduces the empirical model and the 
data used.  Section 4 presents results.  Section 5 provides empirical support to the spatial 
equilibrium that is predicted by the theory model.    Lastly, section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Theory 
     
In this section, I present a spatial model to interpret why inflow of Latinos could induce 
white households to move or switch to private schools.    This model is based on Baum-Snow and 
Lutz (2008) and Hanusheck and Yilmaz (2007) 
 
2.1    A White Only City   
First, consider a city in which only white households exist.    Each household, comprised of 
one adult and one child, lives in one unit of housing.  The adult of a household works in the 
Central Business District (CBD) and has income  y .  The distribution of  y  is  ) (y FW .  
Assume that the adults’ ability distribution is  ) (b GW .    The distribution of ability is orthogonal 
to the distribution of income.  Each child has the same ability as her parent.  The returns to 
education increase in a child’s ability.    Therefore, high ability adults have more incentive than 
low ability adults to invest in their children’s schooling.    There are two types of school: public 
and private.  Public school is free, whereas private schools charge tuition  T .  School quality 
depends on the mean of its students.  private)   public, ( ), ( ∈ ∀ = k b s s
k k .  Private schools are 
produced with a CRS technology.  They are located where there is demand and can 
accommodate any number of students who demand them. 
The preferences of the adults are expressed as a utility function  )) ( , , ( d A s x U
k , where  x  
is the numeraire consumption good, and  A is exogenous local amenities.  Suppose that  A 
increases in  d , the distance to the CBD.    The marginal utility of the local amenities increases 
in income ( 0 3 > y u ) but decreases in ability ( 0 3 < b u ).  The marginal utility of school quality 
increases in income ( 0 2 > y u ) and ability ( 0 2 > b u ).    These assumptions can be summarized to   6
the following single-crossing conditions:  0 12 > u ,  0 13 > u , and  0 23 < u .  
The choice problem of each adult can be represented by   
( 1 )          
private) ( 1 ) ( -     . .
)) ( , , (    Max
= ⋅ + + = ⋅ k T d R x d y t s





where  τ  represents the cost that the adult spends on traveling every unit of distance between 
work and home, and  ) (d R   is the equilibrium rental rate of a unit of land at distance  d .   
) , (
, u d
k y Ψ  is defined as the bid-rent function of the household of income  y , choosing 
school type  k   and having utility  u .    The bid-rent function shows the household’s willingness 
to pay for a unit of space at distance  d  from  the  CBD.  Differentiating  the  constrained  utility 
function yields: 
( 2 )           τ − ⋅ = Ψ d
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which represents the slope of a household’s bid-rent function.    As the CBD distance increases, 
the maximum rent that households are willing to pay increases because of better amenities but 
decreases because of higher commuting costs.    I assume that the benefit from amenities is small, 
meaning the bid-rent curve is downward sloping.    For any given location, the market price of a 
unit of space is determined by the highest bid, meaning the household with the steepest bid-rent 
function lives closer to the CBD.  Therefore, by comparing the slopes at intersection points of 
bid-rent functions, one can understand the spatial ordering of different types of households.     
First, consider that two households of the same income, choosing the same type of school, 
but having different abilities are bidding for the location  d , which is the intersection point of the 
two households’ bid-rent functions.  Because  0 3 < b u , the slope of high-ability household is 
larger than the slope of low-ability household.  Hence, conditional on income and within a 
school, the spatial ordering of households is from high-ability households to low-ability 
households as CBD distance increases.     
Second, consider a marginal household (i ) whose ability level ( i b ) makes it indifferent 
between a private school and a public school.  Any household of the same income but having 
higher ability than  i  attends  the  private  school.  Likewise, any household of the same income   7
but having lower ability than i  attends the public school.  I assume that no matter which 
school the household i  chooses, the quality of either type of school is not affected.   i b  
satisfies that  ) , , ( ) , , (
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Comparing the bid-rent function if the household  i  attends the private school with that if  i 
attends the public school, one can find that the slope of the bid-rent function in the former case is 
larger.  The reason is that private schools require tuition T .  Hence, 




1 u u > , which gives that 
public , private , i
d
i
d i i Ψ < Ψ .  In addition, any household of the same 
income but having higher ability than  i  has a steeper bid-rent function than  i .  Vice versa, 
any household of the same income but having lower ability than  i  has a flatter bid-rent function 
than  i.  Therefore, conditional on income, private school goers outbid public school goers to 
live close to the CBD.     
Third, consider two households of the same ability but different incomes are bidding for the 
location  d , which is the intersection point of the two households’ bid-rent functions.    Since the 














, poor rich, Ψ > Ψ , meaning rich households’ 
bid-rent function is flatter than that poor households.  Conditional on school type, the rich 
outbid the poor to live farther from the CBD and enjoy better amenities. 
Putting the above analysis together, one finds that the poorest households who attend private 
schools live the most inside of the city.    The richest households who attend public schools live 
the most outside of the city.    The order between the richer and private school households and the 
poorer and public school households is not clear yet.  Income effect pushes the richer and 
private households outside, whereas the substitution between commuting cost and school quality 
pulls this type of household inside.  I assume that the income effect dominates the commuting 
cost and school quality effect.    Hence, the richer and private school households live outside of 
the poorer and public school households.    Figure 1a depicts the spatial ordering of households in 
the case that there are only two types of income (rich and poor).  The ordering starting from 
CBD is poor and private, poor and public, rich and private, and rich and public.    Note that since   8
private school requires tuition, the proportion of poor that attends private schools is much lower 
than that of rich.  Essentially, this model shows that the result of residential sorting is that 
people living in one community are very similar in terms of income and ability.     
 
2.2    A Latino-White Mixed City 
Then consider that some Latinos migrate to this city, which is an exogenous shock to the 
original white residents.  Latinos are poorer than whites.  For all  y , the distribution of 
Latinos’ income  ) (y FL  is larger than the distribution of whites’ income  ) (y FW .  Since the 
rich live farther from the CBD than the poor, one would observe that a greater proportion of 
Latinos than white live close to the CBD.  I assume that the ability distribution of Latinos 
) (b GL  is the same as the ability distribution of whites  ) (b GW .  School quality declines as 
Latinos come in because of the negative peer effect that I explained in section 1.  The school 
quality function becomes  ) , (
k k l b s s = , where  l indicates the share of Latinos in the school.  
0
k < l s  means school quality decreases in Latino shares.  Latinos and whites are assumed to 
agree on school quality function.    Given the income and ability level, a Latino household has the 
same choice problem as a white household.  Hence, we can have mixed neighborhoods in all 
parts of a city.     
Though the public schools and private schools both decline in qualities, the extent of change 
is different.    Since Latinos are poorer than whites, the tuition payment forces them to sort into 
public schools at higher rates.  Therefore, public schools’ quality declines more than private 
schools.  This can induce white public school goers flee either to private schools or to less 
Latino areas.  I first analyze the school switchers.  Remember that the ability level of the 










= .  As 
public s  reduces more than 
private s , 
i u2   drops, which implies that 
the ability level of the marginal household  i also drops.  Therefore, more households switch 
from public schools to private schools.     
Moreover, everyone’s bid-rent function becomes flatter, which suggests that people move   9
away from the central city.    The racial composition  ) (l   of a community depends on the income 
level of that community.    Given school type, the income level of a community increases in  d , 
the distance from CBD.  Therefore, the school quality function can be rewritten as 
) , (
k k d b s s =  and  0
k > d s .    The individual choice problem now becomes: 
( 3 )          
) ( -     . .
)) ( ), , ( , (    Max
k
d R x d y t s
d A d b s x U
x,d
+ = ⋅ τ
. 
Differentiating the constrained utility function yields: 
( 4 )           τ − ⋅ + ⋅ = Ψ d d
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Comparing (2) and (4), one can see that, besides amenities, school quality becomes an additional 
issue to induce households to live farther from CBD.    Figure 1b shows the change in the rent-bid 
curves after Latinos move in.    As the figure indicates, some public school households outbid the 
original residents in suburban area to live there.  In suburban area, they attend public schools 
with less Latinos and enjoy better amenities, but have to pay more commuting cost.     
I use the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (LAFANS) data to examine the 
ordering of households that generated by this theory model.  This data provides information 
about the distance between an adult’s workplace and her home.    The distance is broken into four 
categories: less than 2 miles, 2-5 miles, 5-10 miles and more than 10 miles.    I set the rich/poor 
households break at $30,000.
4    White households sampled in Los Angeles County are defined as 
one of four types: poor and private, poor and public, rich and private, and rich and public.    The 
shares of such households in Los Angeles County are respectively 2.11%, 19.83%, 23.21%, and 
54.85%.  Figure 2 presents the histogram of white adults’ employment distance by the 
household types.    Comparing the top row to the bottom row, one sees that, conditional on school 
type, rich people live farther from their work place than poor people.    Compares the left column 
to the right column, one finds that, conditional on income group, private school households are 
more likely than public school households to live close to work.    This is particularly clear when 
one looks at the rich group, which has larger sample size than the poor group.     
                                                        
4  The reason that I use $30,000 as the divides is as follows.    LAFANS data categorizes neighborhoods 
(census tracts) into three categories: very poor, poor and not poor, based on the percent of tract population 
in poverty.    The median household income of the not poor stratum is $30,000.       10
In summary, the theory model predicts the following things: a) In residential equilibrium, 
people living in the same community are very similar to each other; b) An inflow of Latinos to a 
white city induces some white households switch from public schools to private schools; c) An 
inflow of Latinos also induces white public school households to move to less Latino area.   
 
3.    The Data and The Empirical Model 
 
3 . 1   T h e   D a t a      
Before I present the empirical model, I briefly introduce the data that is in use.  I use 
Census 2000 data and the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (LAFANS) data. 
Fieldwork of this survey was conducted between 2000 and 2001.  LAFANS is based on a 
stratified random sample of 65 census tracts
5 in Los Angeles County.  Stratification was 
adopted in order to over-sample poor census tracts.  Within each census tract, 50 households 
were selected at random.    In each household, one randomly selected child (RSC) and the RSC’s 
mother, who was designated the Primary Care Giver (PCG), were interviewed.    In a multi-child 
household, one of the siblings (SIB) of the RSC was also selected at random as a respondent.  
Two variables are used to measure white flight.  First is whether one child attends a private 
school rather than a public school.    About 25% of white children in Los Angeles County attend 
private schools.  Second is whether one household is sure that they will move in the next two 
years.    This is an indicator produced by interaction of two binary variables.    One is whether a 
household plans to move in the next two years.  The other is whether a household is sure that 
they are going to move in the following two years.    About 16% of white households planned to 
move.  Roughly half of them said they were very sure that they would move.  The other half 
were either moderately sure or not at all sure.  Hence, about 8% of white households are very 
sure that they are going to move in the next two years.     
In this paper I use census tract as the unit of community.  After I present the empirical 
                                                        
5  The 65 census tracts are defined using Census 1990 boundary maps.    However, the boundaries of some 
tracts are changed in Census 2000.    According to Census 2000 boundary map, the 65 tracts in 1990 were 
split into 90 tracts in 2000.    LAFANS provides both 1990 and 2000 census tract identifiers to each 
household.    In this paper, I used 2000 census tract identifier to define the community for each household, 
because this survey is actually conducted between 2000 and 2001.    Therefore, there are actually 90 
communities in my sample.   11
model, I will comment about the unit of community that I use.    And I will also discuss about the 
relation between an intention to move and the sorting. 
 
3.2 The Empirical Model 
The theory model predicts that when a white neighborhood receives a sudden “injection” of 
Latino population, white residents would respond by sending children to private schools or by 
moving to less Latino neighborhoods.    However, it is not easy to empirically test this hypothesis.   
Simple empirical model that associates the variation in white households’ school choice with the 
variation in local Latino population across neighborhoods cannot establish the causality between 
the two events.    The concern is mainly due to residential  sorting.  Households self-select into 
different neighborhoods based on elements like parents’ income, job location, residential 
preference and educational preference, which potentially determine school choice as well.    For 
example, white parents who live in affluent suburban neighborhoods on average may have higher 
unobservable abilities than white parents who have to live with many Latinos in dilapidated 
downtown neighborhoods.  Meanwhile, high ability parents may believe that their children are 
smarter than average and that investment in their children’s human capital is very worthy.  
Therefore, one may observe that suburban white residents are more likely to send their children to 
private schools than downtown white residents.    In this case, the relation between neighborhood 
Latino population and white households’ private school attendance can be biased toward zero.  
Another concern is that the simple empirical model cannot disentangle the supply from the 
demand of private school across neighborhoods.    Specifically, roughly 70 percent of Latinos are 
Catholic.  Hence, there might be quite a few Catholic schools in Latino concentrated 
neighborhoods.  This would also induce white families who live in such a neighborhood to 
choose private schools.    In this case, the relation between Latino population and white flight can 
be biased away from zero.    Therefore, to identify whether Latino population induces white flight, 
one needs a source of variation in Latino population that is exogenous to sorting and other 
neighborhood  characteristics.    
Relying on endogenous sorting, I assume that households living in a small community (e.g. a 
census tract) are homogenous in both observed and unobserved attributes.  However, within a 
community, white children of different ages can face different numbers of Latino peers, which is   12
a plausible exogenous variation.  Therefore, the strategy of this paper is to link the school 
choices and intentions to move of households who locate in the same neighborhood but whose 
children are of different ages to the Latino shares of those children’s cohort.    Using Census 2000 
Summary File 4, I compute the share of Latinos by children’s ages for each census tract in Los 
Angeles County.  Due to confidentiality reason, I cannot show the statistics for LAFANS 
surveyed area.    Instead in Figure 3, I present the same statistics of four census tracts in Orange 
County, CA.    One can see in Figure 3 that tracts 86201 and 99202 are more Latino than tracts 
01101 and 32020.    More importantly, the Latino shares vary greatly across cohorts within each 
tract.    Take tract 01101 as an example, Latino children account for more than 60% of 9-year-old 
children, but only 30% of 10-year-old children.     
The key identifying assumption is that the cohort variation in Latino shares within a census 
tract is exogenous.    Using a tract fixed effect model, I test whether the parents whose children 
has a large number of Latino peers are different in observed characteristics from the parents 
living in the same census tract but whose children has a small number of Latino peers.     
(5)       iaj j iaj aj x ε γ β β + + ⋅ + = 1 0 ) Latinos   of   share ( ,  ( 0    : H 1 o = β ) 
where subscription  i  indicates a child-parent pair.  Subscription a  indicates the child’s age.  
Subscription  j  indicates census tract.   x  represents various white parents’ and children’s 
characteristics.   j γ   is the census tract fixed effect.    The hypothesis,  0   1 = β , means the share 
of Latinos is exogenous to  x .    The results are presented in Column I of Table 1.
6  T h e   r e s u l t s  
show that except children’s age, there is no significant correlation within each census tract 
between households’ characteristics and the share of Latino population in their children’s cohort.   
I will address the correlation with children’s age later on.    With this exception, within a census 
tract, the households whose children have many Latino peers do not differ in any observed aspect 
from the households whose children have few Latino peers.  As a contrast, in Column II of 
Table 1, I present the correlation between households characteristics and (Latino share)aj without 
census tract fixed effect.  The results in Column II are completely to the opposite of those in 
Column I.    Without putting fixed effect, all households’ characteristics, except child’s age, are 
                                                        
6  Table 1 shows that the missing household income causes about 20% reduce in sample size.    I will address this 
problem in Section 5.   13
correlated with (Latino share)aj.    The reason is that, when fixed effect is absent, households are 
compared  across  communities.  Hence, the results in column II indicate that, compared to their 
counterparts in white neighborhoods, households living in Latino neighborhoods are poorer, less 
educated, less likely to be a full family and with larger number of children.    This is an evidence 
of sorting across neighborhood.    However, all these correlations disappear when households are 
compared within each census tract.  Therefore, within census tract, there is no evidence of 
self-selection based on children’s cohort.     
    Table  1  shows  that  the  share  of  Latino  peer population decreases with children’s age within 
a census tract.    This finding raises a trend issue that I should address.  Figure 4a presents the 
LA white children’s private school enrollment rate by age.  Figure 4b presents the mean of 
(Latino share)aj by age.  Both trends are downward sloping.  As Mexico and Latin American 
immigrants flow into the US, Latino immigrants may gradually take over some area where used 
to be white neighborhoods.    Hence, in those areas the share of Latino population may increase 
as the cohort become more recent.  However, the trend in white children’s public school 
attendance is not necessarily caused by the trend of Latino population.  For instance, the total 
capacity of magnet high schools and that of middle schools in Los Angeles County is, 
respectively, about three and two times as much as the total capacity of magnet primary schools.   
Therefore, among those children who are looking for high quality education, older children are 
more likely than younger children to go to magnet schools rather than private schools.  If the 
trend issue is ignored, one may naively attribute the upward trend of public school enrollment to 
increasing Latino population.  In order to avoid this mistake, I control for children’s age 
dummies to detrend both the public school enrollment and the share of Latino population. 
The empirical model is expressed as follows:   
( 6 )          iaj j a iaj aj iaj X ε γ α β β + + + ⋅ + = = 2 1 ) Latinos   of   share ( )   1   school   private Pr(  
( 7 )          iaj j a iaj aj iaj X ε γ α β β + + + ⋅ + = = 2 1 ) Latinos   of   share ( )   1   move    to sure Pr( , 
where the subscriptions represent child  i of  age a   in census tract  j ,  X   is a vector of child 
i’s and her parent’s characteristics,  a α  is the cohort fixed effect, and  j γ  is the census tract 
fixed effect.  Lastly, because LAFANS over-sampled poor neighborhoods, all regressions use   14
sampling weights.    In addition, standard errors are clustered by tract-age group. 
Since this empirical model compares households within a census tract, I need to have 
enough variation in Latino shares by cohort within each census tract.  LAFANS data only 
sampled 50 households per census tract.    Some households may not have children at all.    And 
many households are Latinos.    Hence, after dropping missing data, there may be only 2-3 white 
school-aged children in some tracts.  If these children come from a tract with very even race 
distribution by cohort, these observations will be differenced out from the regression.    Therefore, 
the identification of  1 β  is mainly from those tracts with a big variation in Latino shares by 
cohort.    If the tracts with a large cohort variation are different than the tracts with a very small 
cohort variation in some aspects, the estimated  1 β   only reflects the treatment effect in the tracts 
with a large cohort variation, but may not reflect the treatment effect in the tracts with small 
cohort variation.  I examine the correlation between observed census tract characteristics and 
the standard deviation of Latino shares by cohorts within tract.    The result is presented in Table 
2.    The sample is composed of the 37 (out of the total of 90) census tracts that have more than 
two white households surveyed.    Table 2 shows that the standard deviation in Latino shares by 
cohorts within a census tract negatively correlates with the share of total tract population that is 
Latino and positively correlates with the share of adults that with college education. This means 
that  1 β   is identified from white and better-educated neighborhoods.    But this is not a problem.   
First, due to sorting, 80% of white households in LAFANS live in a neighborhood in which the 
share of Latinos is no more than 30%.    Therefore,  1 β   estimated from white neighborhoods can 
actually represent the impact for the majority of white households.    Second, remember from the 
theory model that people of different income and preference are sorted into different 
neighborhoods.  Hence, one cannot expect a white parent who chooses to live in Latino 
neighborhood in the first place would react to the excessive Latino population in her child’s 
cohort in the same way as a white parent who chooses to live in a white neighborhood in the first 
place.  I, therefore, will test in the next section how the treatment effect varies by parents’ 
educational background. 
       15
4.  Results 
 
Table 3a presents a summary of the data and provides a basic picture of white households 
living in LA County.    White children in LA County on average live with a peer group comprised 
of 26% Latino children.  One in four white children attends a private school.  8% households 
are very sure they are going to move in the next year or two.  The mean household income of 
white families in LA County is about $57,000.    A typical white mother has a college education 
and has two children.    And 76.5% of households are full families with the father’s presence.     
Table 3b presents the mean of several important variables by children’s cohort.  It is 
noticeable that cohort age six is a little abnormal.  The private school enrollment of 
six-year-olds’ is significantly larger than that of cohorts of age at least seven.  Perhaps the 
six-year-olds include some private kindergarten goers.  The six-year-olds also has the least 
likelihood of being very sure to move among all cohorts, though the mean of intention to move 
for the six-years-old are not significantly different from the mean of other cohorts.    On the other 
hand, the explanatory variables including Latino share in peers, household income, and mother’s 
education do not vary much between the six-years-old and other cohorts.    For this reason, I drop 
children aged six.  I use children at least seven years old for the school choice model, and 
children aged 3-17, except the six-year-olds, for the moving choice model.  A few regression 
results in this section would be a little different if I had included the six-year-old cohort.
7 
 
4.1 White Flight 
Table 4 presents the empirical result of the impact of Latino peer population on white 
children’s private school enrollment.  To emphasize the importance of the census tract fixed 
effect, I present the regression results with no census fixed effect in the first two columns.    The 
results in Columns 1 and 2 show that the share of Latino population in a child’s cohort and 
neighborhood has no impact on her private school attendance probability.    However, in a model 
with no census tract fixed effect, households are compared across neighborhoods.    1 β  is  biased 
                                                        
7  For example, the impact of (Latino share)aj on school choice is larger if including the six-years-old.    And the 
impact of (Latino share)aj on intention of moving is insignificant from zero if including the six-years-old.   
However, the magnitudes estimated with and without six-year-old are not significantly different from each other.   16
due to residential sorting.    One can see that the point estimations of  1 β   in Columns 1 and 2 are 
very different, though neither of them is significantly different from zero.    This indicates that, in 
the non-fixed-effect model, the (Latino share)aj is correlated with households’ observed 
characteristics and thus may be correlated with the unobservables as well.     
Columns 3 and 4 use the census tract fixed effect model.  The estimated  1 β  becomes 
significantly positive.  After using the tract fixed effect, households are only compared with 
their neighbors, who are supposed to have very similar abilities and preferences in human capital 
investment.  The unobservable abilities that simultaneously determines neighborhood and 
school choice are differenced out between neighbors.  Hence,  1 β  is unbiased.  One can see 
that the values in Columns 3 and 4 are very close, which further confirms that within a census 
tract, the cohort variation in ethnicity composition is an exogenous variable.  The result of the 
tract fixed effect model indicates that for every 10 percentage points increase in Latinos as the 
share of in local peers, white children’s private school enrollment rate increases by three 
percentage  points.   
Next, I study the impact of Latino population on white households’ intention of moving (or 
their regret about previous location choice).    The empirical model is presented by equation (8).   
One thing that complicates the analysis of the intention of moving is that households may have 
multiple children facing different shares of Latinos in their cohorts.    But one household only has 
one intention of moving.  It is possible that a multiple-child household makes moving plan 
based on the eldest child or the child having the largest number of Latino peers.    I will test these 
two possibilities later on.    For now let me simply use single child households.    In this type of 
household, there is no question that parents’ intention of moving depends on the size of Latino 
peers that this single child faces.  Table 5 presents the empirical results.  The sample is 
composed of all households whose single child is 3 years old or older, except that six years old 
children have been dropped.  Columns 1 and 2 do not use the census tract fixed effect while 
Columns 3 and 4 do.  Column 4 indicates that if the share of Latinos in a child’s local peers 
increases by 10 percentage points, her parent is more likely to be sure to move in the next two 
years by eight percentage points.    However, results in Columns 1 and 2 do not indicate that local 
Latino peers would induce white households to move, which implies that the unobservable   17
characteristics common to residents in one neighborhood can prevent them from moving.  For 
example, compared to white households in affluent neighborhoods, those white households who 
live with many Latinos may have less financing capability to facilitate a move.   
I now examine which child in a multi-child household is responsible for parents’ intention of 
moving.  All multi-child households have only two children sampled.  I use these households 
and put both children’s Latino share variables on the  right  hand  side.  The  results  are  presented 
in Table 6.    In Column 1, I rank the two Latino shares by their value and name the two variables 
“maximum Latino share” and “minimum Latino share”.    The result in Column 1 indicates that a 
parent’s intention of moving responds to the larger Latino share of the two sampled children.    In 
Column 4, I rank the two Latino shares by children’s age and name the two variables “old Latino 
share” and “young Latino share”.  The result in Column 4 indicates that parents’ moving 
decision responds to the older one of the two children.         
Though the LAFANS only interviewed two children in a multi-child household, some 
households in the survey actually had three or even more children.  Among the 116 white 
households with two sampled children, 75 (65%) households have only two children, whereas 41 
households had three or more children.  Hence, the observed maximum or minimum Latino 
shares are not the true ones for the 41 households.  Further, the older or younger child is not 
necessarily the eldest or youngest child in the family.    In households with at least three children, 
the observed children perhaps are not the most influential ones, since the intention of moving 
may actually be induced by an unobserved child.    I test this hypothesis in Columns 2 and 4.    I 
interact the two observed Latino shares with a binary variable which indicates whether a 
household has more than two children or not.    The coefficients of the two observed Latino share 
variables represent the impact on the intention to move of only-two-children households.  The 
coefficients of the two observed Latino shares plus the coefficients of the two interaction terms 
represent the impact of observed Latino shares on the intention to move of 
more-than-two-children households.    Column 2 indicates that for only-two-children households, 
the true maximum Latino share has a significant impact on inducing the households to move away.   
For every 10 percentage points increase in the maximum Latino share, the intention to move of a 
white household increases by 7.5 percentage points.  However, for more-than-two-children 
households, the influence of the observed maximum Latino share drops by 4.6 percentage points,   18
though this decline is not precisely measured with only 41 households.    It is very likely that the 
influence of the observed maximum Latino share diminishes if an unobserved child faces even 
larger numbers of Latino peers.    Column 4 indicates that for only-two-children households, the 
Latino share of the peers of the eldest child has a significant impact on inducing them to move.   
For every 10 percentage points increase in the Latino share that eldest child faces, the intention to 
move of a white household increases by six percentage points.    For households with more than 
two children, the influence of the older sampled child drops by 1.7 percentage points.    But this 
drop is not statistically significant from zero. 
I have shown that Latino population induces white households to move.    But it remains to 
show whether the white households are moving to the area that their children will have less 
Latino peers.    Though LAFANS does not provide data to directly answer the question, it has the 
record of which census tract each household lived two years before.    One can use census data to 
track the share of Latinos in each mover’s old neighborhood and in each child’s cohort.  This 
information can help us to investigate the direction in which white households’ are moving.  
Figure 5a presents the distribution of the local Latino share in white children’s cohorts and in 
their old neighborhoods.    The solid blue curve is the distribution of all white households.    The 
dashed red curve is the distribution of all movers.    If the movers were a random draw from total 
white households, the two distributions would have been in the same shape.  However, the 
distinction between the two distributions is quite clear.  While the distribution of all white 
households is heavily skewed toward low (less than 20%) Latino cohort-tracts, the movers’ 
distribution has a peak in high Latino cohort-tracts.    For about half of movers, at least 40% of 
their children local peers in the original tracts were Latinos.  This finding is consistent with 
previous regression results that movers are not a random draw.  The more Latino peers live in 
one tract, the more likely whites in that cohort-tract are to leave.  Figure 5b compares the 
distribution of Latino shares between old and current cohort-tracts for movers.    The post-move 
distribution is obviously less Latino than the pre-move distribution, which suggests that white 
households move from high Latino cohort-tracts to less Latino cohort-tracts.     
 
4.2. Attending Public School Vs. Moving Out 
White households flee from Latino households either by sending children to private schools   19
or by moving to less Latino neighborhoods, or by doing both.    The next question is what type of 
households chooses each option.  The theory model in Section 2 suggests that high ability 
households will send their children to private schools.  Since education level and ability is 
positively correlated, adults’ educational background might play an important role in determining 
in which way a household will flee from Latinos.  I test the following two hypotheses.  In 
response to a large local Latino peer population, white parents with a high education background 
are more likely than white parents with a low education to send children to private schools.  
White parents with a low education background are more likely than their highly educated 
counterparts to move away.     
  To test the above hypotheses, I allow the impact of local Latino population on white flight 
to vary by white parents’ educational background.  I categorize adults’ education into two 
groups: years of school are no less than 12 and years of school are more than 12.    About 20% of 
sampled white mothers are in the low education category.    The empirical models are written as: 
(8) 
iaj j a iaj iaj aj aj
iaj
X ε γ α β β β + + + ⋅ + × + =
=
3 2 1 ) education high  ( ) Latinos   of   share ( ) Latinos   of   share (
)   1   school   private Pr(
(9) 
iaj j a iaj iaj aj aj
iaj
X ε γ α β β β + + + ⋅ + × + =
=
3 2 1 ) education high  ( ) Latinos   of   share ( ) Latinos   of   share (
)   1   move    to sure Pr(
In both models,  1 β   is the impact of Latinos on white flight for less educated parents,  2 1 β β +  
is the impact of Latinos on white flight for highly educated parents, and  2 β  represents the 
difference in the impact of Latinos on white flight across education groups.  Here,  2 β  is 
hypothesized to be positive in model (8) and negative in model (9). 
The regression results are presented in Table 7.  Column 1 shows that the impact of the 
local Latino peer population on white households’ school choice varies by adults’ educational 
backgrounds.    For white parents with no more than 12 years of schooling, there is no significant 
impact on parents’ school choice from Latino share in children’s local cohort.  However, for 
white parents with at least 13 years of schooling, the impact is significantly larger.    For every 10 
percentage point increase in Latino share in children’s local cohort, highly educated white parents   20
are more likely to send their children to private school by 3.3 percentage points. 
As to parents’ intention to move, I use two samples.    Column 2 uses a sample composed of 
single child households and the older children from multi-child households.  Column 3 uses a 
sample composed of single child households and the children with the larger Latino shares from 
multi-child households.    Both samples generate very close results.    The results indicate that the 
impact of local Latino population on white households’ intention to move varies by adults’ 
education background.    The intention to moving of both less educated white parents and highly 
educated parents are positively affected by local Latino share.    However, the magnitude of such 
an impact is significantly different between the two types of parents.  Take Column 2 as an 
example.  For every 10 percentage points increase in Latino share that the single child or the 
older child faces, white parents with a low education ground are more likely to move by 10 
percentage points, whereas white parents with a high education background are more likely to 
move by 6.4 percentage points.  For the same change in Latino share, the impact for highly 
education white parents is about two-thirds of the impact for less educated parents, and the 
difference in magnitude is significantly different from zero.    Combining the result in Columns 1 
and 2, one can see that white adults with different educational background respond to the Latino 
share of children’s peers in different ways.    Adults with no more than a high school education 
will move to less Latino neighborhoods so that their children can go to better quality public 
schools.    Adults with more that a high school graduation will not only move but also send their 




5.1 About Moving 
The identification of the tract fixed effect model relies on endogenous sorting, meaning 
similar people live in the same tract at equilibrium.  The observed residence location of each 
household can be regarded as their optimal choice.    If this is true, one may wonder why some of 
them still plan to move.  Two possible cases may reconcile this paradox.  First, when people 
choose where to live, they have an impression about the overall ethnic mix of the objective 
neighborhoods.  However, they may not realize there can be a cohort variation within a   21
neighborhood or a local public school.  If the parents later find that their children have many 
more Latino peers than they originally thought, they will regret their previous decision and 
consider moving again.  However, when the parents start a new search of residence location, 
there still might be chances that the actual Latino share in their children’s cohort is not what they 
aim to.    In this case, the intention of moving used in this paper just reflects white household’s 
regret about previous location choice and their reaction to unluckiness, but does not imply that 
they are different from other household in the same neighborhood.     
A second explanation is that local ethnic composition can change over time.  Between a 
household who has lived in one neighborhood for a long time and another household who just 
moved to the neighborhood, the current characteristics of the neighborhood should better fit the 
preference of the new arrival.  The long-time residents who don’t like the change in the 
neighborhood would consider a move.  Hence, one would expect that the Latino share in local 
cohort should have stronger push effect on long-time white residents than new arrivals.  I run 
the regressions of school choice and moving intension (equations (6) and (7)) separately for white 
households who have lived in current neighborhood for at least two years and for those who have 
lived for less than two years.  In the private school choice model, the coefficient of 
aj ) Latinos   of   share (   is 0.42 (p-value=0.01) for residents living for at least two years and -0.427 
(p-value=0.46) for residents living for less than two years.    In the moving intention model
8, the 
coefficient of  aj ) Latinos   of   share (   is 0.376 (p-value=0.07) for residents living for at least two 
years and -0.309 (p-value=0.86) for residents living for less than two years.    The above results 
show that the Latino share predicts old residents’ behavior better than new residents’ behavior.   
 
5.2 A Falsification Test 
    The mechanism that I propose to explain the causal link between local Latino peers and 
white flight is that white parents are concerned that Latino peers in their children’s class possibly 
reduce the quality of the education in the class.    In order to demonstrate this argument, I provide 
the following falsification test.  I replace the local Latino share in each child’s cohort by the 
                                                        
8 I use the sample composed of single child households and the children with the larger Latino shares from multi-child 
households.   22
local Latino share in other cohorts.    For example, I use the local Latino share of the cohort that 
is two years younger, or two years older, than that of a child’s actual age.  The model is 
represented as follows: 
( 1 0 )          iaj j a iaj j a iaj X ε γ α β β + + + ⋅ + = = ± 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) Latinos   of   share ( )   1   school   private Pr(  
( 1 1 )          iaj j a iaj j a iaj X ε γ α β β + + + ⋅ + = = ± 2 ) 2 ( 1 ) Latinos   of   share ( )   1   move    to sure Pr( . 
1 β   is hypothesized to be zero.    Because Latino children of other cohorts would not affect child 
i’s class at school, child  i’s parents should not react to the Latino populations of other cohorts.   
Note that a zero 1 β  does not mean that white parents are not expected to care about Latino 
children of other cohorts.  Since this is a tract fixed effect model, the preference of white 
parents over the total number of Latino children in the neighborhood is differenced out.  The 
falsification test is to verify that, conditioning on the neighborhood ethnic composition, the shock 
of the number of Latino children in the same cohort have a stronger influence than the shock from 
other cohorts on a white household’s school choice and moving decision.     
        The falsification test results are presented in Table 8.    Columns 1 and 2 are for the school 
choice model.  The first and the second column, respectively, use the cohort that is two years 
younger and two years older than child  i ’ cohort.    These two columns show that school choice 
is unrelated to ethnic composition of other cohorts.    Columns 3-8 are for the intention to move 
model.    Columns 3 and 4 use single child households.    Columns 5 and 6 use the children with 
the larger Latino share in multi-child households.  Columns 7 and 8 use the children with the 
smaller Latino share in multi-child households.    Columns 3-7 show that there is no impact from 
the false Latino share on households’ intention to move.    The only exception happens in Column 
8 when replacing the true Latino share by the Latino share of the two years older cohort for the 
child who originally had smaller Latino share in her household.    Only in this case does the false 
Latino share appear to impact the households’ intention to move.  This is in fact interesting.  
Remember that the false cohort is two years older than the true cohort.    It is likely that I replace 
the true Latino share by the child’s elder sibling’s Latino share.    In addition, the child originally 
has smaller Latino share than her sibling.  Therefore, I actually replace the younger and 
“minimum” kid by the older and “maximum” kid.    In this case, the true Latino share is replaced   23
by the more influential sibling’s Latino share.  Therefore, the impact of Latino share on the 
white households’ intention to move shows up.  This case in fact confirms my previous result 
that the older and “maximum” kid is the key kid to influence a household’s moving decision.  
Other than this special case, the mechanism through peer effect is supported everywhere else.         
 
5.3 The Impact from Language   
    In section 2, I proposed that one aspect of potential negative peer effect from Latino 
children is due to their limited English proficiency.    If this is true, the negative impact not only 
works on non-Hispanic white children but also on Latino children who speak English well.    One 
would expect that English-speaking Latino households may also flee from other Latinos.  I 
therefore use Latino households and separate them into two groups by mother’s language 
preference, and test whether the two groups have different preference on staying with people of 
the same ethnicity.  One group is composed of Latino households in which the mother did the 
LAFANS survey in English.  The other group is composed of Latino households in which the 
mother did the survey in Spanish.    In the moving intention model (equation (7))
9, the coefficient 
of  aj ) Latinos   of   share (   is negative and statistically significant for Spanish-speaking Latino 
households, indicating that they prefer living with other Latinos.  However, the coefficient is   
positive but statistically insignificant for English-speaking Latino households, indicating that 
they do not prefer living with other Latinos.  These results show that, for English-speaking 
Latino mothers, the preference of living with people of the same ethnicity can be off-set by their 
potential concern about their children’s learning  environment.           
 
5.4 Census Tracts Vs. School Attendance Zones 
In this paper, I use ethnic composition in each census tract to approximate the ethnic 
composition that a white child faces at school.    Measurement errors can arise for several reasons.   
First, one school attendance zone is larger than a census tract in most cases.  In 2000, Los 
Angeles County has 2,028 census tracts, about 1,600 elementary schools, 800 junior high schools 
and 400 high schools.  Since the size of a census tract is close to the size of an elementary 
                                                        
9  The regressions using equation (6) do not show that the two groups behave differently in choosing private schools.    This is 
not surprising since Latino families tend to have income constrain to sending children to private schools.   24
school attendance zone, using census tracts approximation may not be too bad for children 
younger than 13
10.    But for older children, one school attendance zone is as large as 2.5-5 census 
tracts.  Using tract level data, I perhaps exaggerate the variation in ethnicity composition by 
cohorts.  Mismeasurement may downward bias the estimation.  However, my empirical test 
does not show that the impact of  aj ) Latinos   of   share (   is significantly different between children 
younger than 13 and older children.  Yet, future work using variation by grade within each 
school is needed to examine the results in this paper. 
    Second, some arrangements in the public school system can reduce the probability that 
white children sit in the same classroom as a Latino children even if they live in one 
neighborhood, for example, magnet schools, gifted programs, and the flexibility that allows 
parents to send children to a non-neighborhood public school.    However, all these factors would 
only bias my estimations toward zero.  Therefore, the estimates presented in this paper can be 
regarded as the lower bound of the impact of local Latino population on white flight. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper studies the impact of Latino population on white flight.  I use a census tract 
fixed effect model to examine whether the white households whose children face a large share of 
Latinos in their cohorts are more likely to flee than the white households who live in the same 
census tract but whose children face a small share of Latinos in their cohorts.  Based on the 
residential sorting theory, the households living in one neighborhood are supposed to be 
homogenous people.  Hence, the cohort-to-cohort variation in racial composition within a 
neighborhood, which is an idiosyncratic shock, can be used to establish the causal impact from 
local Latino population on white households’ school and neighborhood choice.  Using the Los 
Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, I find that for every 10 percentage points increase in 
the share of Latinos in a white child’s cohort and neighborhood, she is more likely to attend 
private school by three percentage points, or her household is more likely to move to a less Latino 
neighborhood in the next two years by 6-8 percentage points.    Census data indicates that, during 
                                                        
10  There are still measurement errors, because school district boundaries do not perfectly overlap with census tract boundaries,     25
1990-2000, the Latino share in California total population increased by seven percentage points 
and the public school enrollment rate of non-Hispanic white children reduced by 2.4 percentage 
points.  If the estimated impact of Latino shares on white flight from Los Angeles county 
applies to the whole state of California, white flight from Latinos can explain 88% percentage of 
the change in public school enrollment rate of white children.   
The falsification test shows that, conditioning on the neighborhood choice, non-Hispanic 
white households react particularly to the size of Latino population of their children’s cohort, but 
not to other cohorts.  This provides evidence that white flight from Latinos probably is due to 
white parents’ concern about the negative peer effect from Latino children in classrooms at local 
public schools.    The negative peer effect can arise from Latino children’s English inproficiency.   
Empirical analysis in this paper shows that Latino households who speak English well do not 
prefer to live with other Latinos.    Therefore, one policy that can reduce ethnic segregation is to 
promote Latino children’s English proficiency.       26
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Figure 1.    Equilibrium of Residential Location Pattern 
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Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey 
Notes:  
The four categories of employment distance from home are less than 2 
miles, 2-5 miles, 5-10 miles and more than 10 miles. 
Rich households’ income is more than 30k and poor households’ income is 
less than 30k.   29
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Source: Census 2000 summary file 4.  30
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Source: LAFANS     31
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Table 1.    Pair-wise Correlation between White Households’ Characteristics 
And Share of Latinos by Cohort by neighborhood 
 
Dependent: (share of Latinos)aj 
      I  II  observations 
(1) ln(household  income)  -0.0087  -0.0704***  399 
   [0.0093]  [0.0081]   
(2) welfare  use  0.004  0.1026***  473 
   [0.0212]  [0.0296]   
(3) mom's  education  0.0038  -0.0273***  507 
   [0.0037]  [0.0049]   
(4) mom's  age  -0.0015  -0.0056***  505 
   [0.0011]  [0.0020]   
(5)  dad in hh  0.0062  -0.0561*  507 
   [0.0195]  [0.0324]   
(6) #  of  children  -0.0069  0.0276**  506 
   [0.0068]  [0.0133]   
(7) child's  age  -0.0050*** 0.0003  507 
    [0.0016] [0.0033]  
   tract  fixed  effect     Y     N    
 
Note: 
(share of Latino children)aj is computed using census summary file 4.   
Other variables are from LAFANS data. 
All correlations in column I are estimated using census tract fixed 
effect model.  See Equation (5) in text.  All correlations in column 
II do not use census tract fixed effect.   
Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for 
children. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.    Pair-wise Correlation between S.D. of Latino Shares   
and Characteristics of Census Tract 
 
Dependent: SD of (Latino Children)aj in tract j 
(1) (share of Latino in total population)j  -0.0574* 
   [0.0295] 
(2) ln(median hh income)  -0.0114 
   [0.0208] 
(3) ln(income per cap)  0.0177 
   [0.0159] 
(4) poverty rate  -0.074 
   [0.0744] 
(5) welfare use rate  0.0269 
   [0.1324] 
(6) unemployment rate  0.092 
   [0.1039] 
(7) college education  0.0694* 
   [0.0358] 
   Observations  37 
Source: Census Summary File 4 
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Table 3a.    Summary of The Data 
 
Variable Observation Mean  Std.  Dev. 
child      
private school  294  0.257  0.438 
(share of Latinos)aj  333 0.262  0.273 
household      
sure to move in 2 yrs  238  0.080  0.272 
ln(household income)  238  10.951  1.287 
mom's age  238  41.735  8.054 
mom's years of schooling  238  15.849  2.421 
dad in household  238  0.765  0.423 
# of children  238 2.008  1.055 
 









sure to move 





3 24 0.163    0.182 11.460 16.167 
4 21 0.260    0.056 11.605 16.667 
5 18 0.347    0.154 10.875 15.389 
6  29 0.283  0.414 0.038  11.308 16.207 
7 20 0.353  0.300  0.059 11.021 15.800 
8 24 0.376  0.292  0.053 10.936 14.958 
9 33 0.308  0.313  0.074 10.901 15.212 
10 24 0.182 0.250  0.105  10.966  16.375 
11 27 0.257 0.115  0.160  10.758  15.852 
12 20 0.193 0.250  0.067  11.162  15.500 
13 29 0.276 0.241  0.048  11.087  16.207 
14 33 0.256 0.219  0.071  11.113  16.182 
15 29 0.238 0.148  0.125  10.364  15.000 
16 36 0.209 0.205  0.139  10.569  15.537 
17  27 0.372  0.273  0.043 10.416  15.556 
Notes: 
(share of Latinos)aj is computed using census summary file 4.  Other variables are from 
LAFANS data.   35
 
Table 4.    The Impact of Latino Population on White Households’ School Choice 
 
Dependent: Private School =1          
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(Latino Share)aj  -0.0012 0.1015  0.3310** 0.2710** 
 [0.1051]  [0.1140]  [0.1404]  [0.1354] 
ln(household income)    0.0322*    0.0552** 
   [0.0188]    [0.0214] 
mom age    0.0169    0.0167 
   [0.0201]    [0.0201] 
mom age squared    -0.0002    -0.0001 
   [0.0002]    [0.0002] 
mom years of schooling    0.0329***    0.0039 
   [0.0085]    [0.0075] 
dad in household    -0.1382**    -0.1408** 
   [0.0667]    [0.0623] 
# of children    0.0443**    0.0264 
   [0.0220]    [0.0210] 
catholic   0.1245**    0.0795 
   [0.0574]    [0.0537] 
(total population)aj   -0.0001    0.0007 
   [0.0003]    [0.0005] 
Constant 0.1693*** -1.0696**  0.0755*  -0.9657* 
 [0.0398]  [0.4890]  [0.0424]  [0.4933] 
child's age dummies  N  Y  N  Y 
census tract fix effect  N  N  Y  Y 
Observations 294  294  294  294 
R-squared 0  0.16  0.44  0.51 
Notes: 
Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
Standard errors are clustered by tract-age groups. Robust stand errors are in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.    The Impact of Latino Population on White Households’ Moving Decision 
(Single Child Households) 
 
Dependent: Very Sure to Move in Two Years =1    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(Latino Share)aj  0.0623 0.024  0.5959 0.8063** 
 [0.0831]  [0.1173]  [0.5560] [0.3746] 
ln(household  income)   0.0137   0.0205 
   [0.0145]   [0.0272] 
mom  age   -0.0337*  -0.0845** 
   [0.0192]   [0.0379] 
mom  age  squared   0.0003   0.0008** 
   [0.0002]   [0.0004] 
mom years of schooling    -0.0062    0.0015 
   [0.0088]   [0.0165] 
dad  in  household   0.0095   0.0203 
   [0.0341]   [0.0657] 
#  of  children   0.0432*   0.0711 
   [0.0237]   [0.0430] 
(total population)aj   0.0002   0.0006 
   [0.0002]   [0.0011] 
Constant 0.0368  0.7894  -0.0863  1.2122 
 [0.0313]  [0.6077]  [0.1030] [1.1010] 
child's  age  dummies  N Y N  Y 
census tract fix effect  N  N  Y  Y 
Observations 96  96  96  96 
R-squared 0  0.41  0.25  0.65 
Notes: 
Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
Standard errors are clustered by tract-age groups. Robust stand errors are 
in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   37
 
Table 6.    The Impact of Latino Population on White Households’ Moving Decision 
(Multi-Child Households) 
 
Dependent: Very Sure to Move in Two Years =1    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
max(Latino Share)aj 0.5535*  0.7505**   
 [0.3204]  [0.3549]     
min(Latino Share)aj -0.1816  -0.3131     
 [0.2978]  [0.3610]     
max(Latino Share)aj   -0.4566     
* (=1 if >2 children)    [0.4134]     
min(Latino Share)aj   0.3908     
* (=1 if >2 children)    [0.5447]     
old(Latino Share)aj     0.5025** 0.6103* 
     [0.2462]  [0.3347] 
young(Latino Share)aj     0.0894  0.1416 
     [0.2293]  [0.2836] 
old(Latino Share)aj       -0.1695 
* (=1 if >2 children)        [0.3659] 
young(Latino Share)aj       -0.1526 
* (=1 if >2 children)        [0.3125] 
other controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
child's age dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
census tract fix effect  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 115  115  115  115 
R-squared 0.66  0.61  0.67  0.61 
Notes: 
Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
Standard errors are clustered by tract-age groups. Robust stand errors are in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  38
 
Table 7.    The Role of Adults’ Education in Determining the Way of Fleeing 
 
Dependent Variable  private school  very sure to move in 2 yrs 
   single+older kid single+max kid
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
1 β (the impact for households    0.0325 1.0368***  1.1934*** 
whose years of schooling <=12)  [0.1570]  [0.2910]  [0.3007] 
2 1 β β + (the impact for households  0.3360** 0.6446*** 0.7159*** 
whose years of schooling >12)  [0.1456]  [0.2331]  [0.2694] 
2 β  (difference)  0.3035* -0.3791* -0.4346* 
 [0.1698]  [0.2238]  [0.2228] 
other controls  Y  Y  Y 
child's age dummies  Y  Y  Y 
census tract fix effect  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 294  211  211 
Notes: 
Column 1 uses all children. Column 2 uses single child plus the older sampled child 
from multi-child households. Column 3 uses single child plus the sampled child who 
is from multi-child households and have larger (Latino share)aj than the other sampled 
child of the same household. 
Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
Standard errors are clustered by tract-age groups. Robust stand errors are in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8.  Falsification  Test 
 
Dependent  private school  very sure to move in 2 yrs 
       
single child 
Max Latino share 
child  
Min Latino share 
child 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) 
(Latino share)a-2,j -0.0775   -0.264    -0.0617   0.0624  
  [0.1326]   [0.2369]   [0.2960]   [0.1545]  
(Latino share)a+2,j   0.0677   0.0802   -0.0636   0.3668* 
   [0.1493]  [0.3435]   [0.2715]   [0.2032] 
other  controls  Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y Y 
age  dummies  Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y Y 
tract  fixed  effect  Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y Y 
Observations  293 293 96  96 115 115 115  115 
Notes: 
Columns 1 and 2 use all children. Columns 3 and 4 use single child. Columns 5 and 6 use the sampled 
child who is from multi-child households and have larger (Latino share)aj than the other sampled 
child of the same household. Columns 7 and 8 use the sampled child who is from multi-child 
households and have larger (Latino share)aj than the other sampled child of the same household. 
Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
Standard errors are clustered by tract-age groups. Robust stand errors are in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   40
 
Appendix Table 1 
Population and Public School Enrollment by race in CA (1990-2000) 
 
   1990  2000  change 
population (million) 
Hispanic   7.558  10.969  3.412 
Non-Hispanic White  17.094  15.771  -1.323 
Non-Hispanic Black  2.111  2.148  0.037 
Non-Hispanic Asian  2.748  3.643  0.895 
Total 29.760  33.872  4.112 
public school enrollment rate 
Hispanic   0.936  0.949  0.013*** 
Non-Hispanic White  0.88  0.856  -0.024*** 
Non-Hispanic Black  0.913  0.914  0.001 
Non-Hispanic Asian  0.901  0.889  -0.012*** 
  Sources: Census and IPUMS 5%, 1990 and 2000     